AMERICAN, CHINESE AND RUSSIAN FACTORS IN INTERACTION OF CENTRAL AND SOUTH ASIAN STATES*

Abstract. The paper aims at brief analytical consideration of ‘external powers’ factor as either true or false materialization of would-be scientific concept of the ‘New Great Game’ through the prism of South Asian states’ interests in view of their interaction with the republics of Central Asia. The research presented in the paper is performed on the basis of analysis of works and oral statements on this issue by Indian and Pakistani scholars and experts over the past quarter century. Taking into account a complex of historical-geographical and political-economic reasons, the main attention is paid to the role and place of states such as the United States of America, the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation. Through a brief sum-up of specific situations and examples, it is shown that for each of these three powers the representatives of India and Pakistan have virtually a full range of positive, neutral and negative theoretical calculations and practical experience that determine their final assessment of actual significance of ‘external factor’ in relations between their countries and Central Asian republics. In conclusion, it is argued that despite true-to-life presence of a number of features of the ‘New Great Game’ in Central Asian region, this phenomenon nevertheless did not receive its full materialization principally because of increasingly consolidated actual status of Central Asian states as subjects rather than objects of international relations.

Keywords: Central and South Asia, USA, China, Russia, ‘New Great Game’, geopolitics, security, integration initiatives.

Introduction. Numerous representatives of academic, business and ruling circles of Central and South Asian states conventionally specify the factor of external regional and global powers among the reasons that exert certain either positive or negative impact upon the features of interaction between these two regions.

At that, in the Central Asian republics as a rule it is merely ascertained that external powers (along with other countries that do not enjoy a full-fledged status of powers though have proven themselves as more or less reliable partners of these republics in any sphere, as well as ever-present international financial institutions and transnational corporations) in one way or another indeed influence or are able to influence and even interfere into the cooperation of separate states or entire regions of Central and South Asia. While representatives of South Asia – above all of India and Pakistan as its leading countries which in comparison with other states of their region are most actively involved into diverse relations with the republics of Central Asia – perceive the factor of external powers as playing crucial, sometimes critical role both for these republics and for their partners and neighbours in general.

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Such an opinion is generated by a number of reasons of mostly exclusively but sometimes of simultaneously objective and subjective nature. Among the former, one can point to the colonial past of both regions, when their respective metropolises in one way or another were engaged into political and economic contacts of respectively Central Asian state formations and subsequently Soviet republics and British India; to the modern geopolitical alignment of forces over the global arena, within which there exists a dilemma of either unipolar or multipolar world, the issues of (non-)legitimacy and (non-)expediency of interfering into the internal affairs of sovereign states combined with the practice of military-political and economic alliances, subversion of ‘undesirable’ governments and implanting own values, etcetera. Among the reasons of subjective character, one should mention the views of representatives of South Asia and the entire global community upon Central Asia as one of politically and economically – primarily in terms of raw materials – strategically significant regions of the world, and at the same time perception of states of this region as more objects rather than subjects of international geopolitical and geo-economic relations [for more details on this question see 1]. And no matter how true or erroneous these views and perceptions are, since the moment Central Asian republics gained their independence, they and their region in whole are viewed as a field for the ‘New Great Game’ (a term attributed to various authors that has been coined by the well-known analogy of the XIX century ‘Great Game’ in Central Asia between the Russian and the British Empires). Despite all the artificiality, in many respects even the absurdity of this term, it for numerous reasons is actively supported and logically developed by representatives not only of India, Pakistan and other foreign states, but also of the Central Asian republics themselves. And regardless of whether it is possible to talk about any particular Game or merely about a situation typical for many other regions and countries of the world, in any case it seems reasonable to reckon with the factor of external powers or at least not to ignore it.

At that, the list of powers directly or indirectly impacting the nature of interaction between India and Pakistan on one hand and the Central Asian republics on another invariably includes Russia (for historical, geographical, political and economic reasons), China (for the last three reasons, with the primacy of economic one) and the United States of America (for the last two reasons, with the prevalence of political one). Hence, it seems highly relevant to consider the views of representatives of South Asian side upon such an impact, taking into account their own experience of cooperation or rivalry with these three powers, and on this basis to draw an indirect conclusion about the place and role of such an ‘external’ factor in relations between the states of Central and South Asia.

Methods. As one can infer from the above-mentioned propositions, theoretically the would-be scientific hypothesis of the ‘New Great Game’ in Central Asia, as well as the concept of actual or formal sovereignty (that is, an antithesis of ‘either subject or object’ of international relations) with respect to all the parties under concern underlie the study summarized in this paper. Methodologically, the work is performed and its conclusions and results are obtained through the critical analysis (along with contrastive comparison with naturally existing reality) of numerous research and expert writings by representatives of two leading South Asian countries over the past quarter century.

Results and discussion. An analysis of numerous works and sayings by Indian and Pakistani authors written and expressed since the early 1990’s up to the very present moment allows to conclude the following.

A Factor of the US. An appraisal of US-Indian relations varies from extremely positive – a comprehensive rapprochement between the two states with India as a conductor of US interests in Central Asia, to extremely negative – in reality, even the US-China military alliance is more likely than the US-Indian one.

Regarding the first proposition, it should be noted that yet since the early 1990’s South Asian side is aware of the fact that its attempts to open “courting the West, especially the U.S., which appears to be replacing the former Soviet Union as its military and economic partner”, can alert Central Asian states [2, p. 75], especially if one takes into account subsequent actual highly probable participation of the West in creating situations of political instability in the countries of Central Asia (the ‘orange’ revolution in Kyrgyzstan, the Andijan events in Uzbekistan and the Zhanaozen events in Kazakhstan). With regard to the second statement, the following inference can be cited: “Visits of American leaders to India should not be considered as invectives against China, as some believe, but as no more than a kind of ‘seduction’ between the United States and India. In reality, India should not count on any significant benefits from
cooperation with the United States. It has no chance to expect anything good from the United States at all, since they do not intend to provide anything to India. The United States has more than once betrayed India and never did anything for it gratuitously (unlike the former USSR) and in the way it appeared beneficial for India itself. India is already surrounded by the USA; this also threatens Russia. But, perhaps, the United States will not succeed in realizing its plans, since some of the Central Asian republics which the United States previously wished to rely upon, are again gradually drawn towards Russia. India and the Central Asian states must jointly fight the expansion of the United States in Asia” [3]. It is noteworthy that back in 2007, Indian expert A. Patnaik expressed a similar opinion on this issue: “Currently, the Central Asian states, seeing that the US’s goals are not to promote democratization, but to establish control over their natural resources, began to integrate against the US among themselves and with various regional powers, including Russia and China; prospects for Kazakhstan–Indian political integration can be considered in the same context. We should strengthen the CICA and the SCO in order to prevent the US from penetrating the region and gain a foothold here. In historical terms, the United States came to the region not so long ago, and still does not have solid foundations for its activities here – and we should not provide them with such the foundations” [4].

As is known, the US-Pakistani relations in recent times, especially after 2001 are also considered as more and more ambiguous and causing more questions.

The purpose of this paper is not to select any point of view regarding the US relationship with the two main states of South Asia. However, on the basis of studying the opinions of various Indian experts and officials, including those not reflected in the printed works, one can conclude the following. India, as it used to do throughout the history of its independent existence, is carefully studying and evaluating all the proposals and projections of the United States concerning joint American-Indian penetration into Central Asia. And if these proposals turn out to be really profitable, it is possible that India will support them. Thus, India has indeed always supported activities of the United States in Central Asia aimed at preventing the spread of radical Islamic elements; however, to the same extent India supported similar activities of Russia and even China, since, first of all, it was interested in secure and secular nature of regimes in Central Asian republics. However, to date the opinion of Indian analysts regarding positive role of the United States in maintaining order and stability in Central Asia has somewhat changed. Thus, yet R. Dwivedi noted that though “it has been claimed that United States presence in Central Asia has played a positive role in neutralising extremist forces”, but at the same time Central Asian “Islamic figures and opposition leaders are receiving warm welcome in Washington” [5, pp. 417-418].

Moreover, knowing full well that the interests of the United States in Central Asia are closely related to their goal of achieving international hegemony, most Indian specialists examining the issues of South and Central Asian interaction are concerned about increasing US economic and political role in the Central Asian region; they fear that from this region the United States will begin to put pressure upon India itself. In this regard, Indian side’s dissatisfaction is caused, in particular, by position of the United States in the oil fields of Kazakhstan, since, in its opinion, it is not Russian or Chinese, but American oil companies that to the greatest extent prevent India from entering Kazakhstani hydrocarbon market. Moreover, according to the opinion of M. Haydar expressed as early as 2006, “if US succeeds in using energy resources as an instrument of its external policy it would be reducing India into vulnerable position” [6, p. 28].

In this regard, yet after the Central Asian states provided the United States with various favourable conditions for waging war against a hotbed of terrorism in Afghanistan in the early 2000’s, cautious warnings about this circumstance began to appear in the researches by Indian authors. At the same time, Indian experts had little doubt that “the withdrawal of the US troops from Afghanistan would result in dilution of the US influence in Central Asia” [7]. And when the US position in the region actually began to weaken, it was greeted by many in India with obvious relief and even enthusiasm. And although in general Indians still support American participation in Afghan affairs, their disenchantment with the place and role of the United States itself in the Central Asian mega-region is increasing: “the US has a bad hand in this [Afghan – Ye.R.] game, a loser whether it stays or goes” [8].

India’s dissatisfaction is also caused by the US attempts to involve Central Asian states in a standoff with Iran. In addition, the Indian side is also displeased with the fact that the US strongly encourages the integration of the Central Asian republics into international political and financial organizations under...
control of Washington. As active member and partner of such organizations, India itself does not accept any dominance and dictate of individual states and does not want this dictate to spread to the Central Asian republics as its ‘extended neighbours’.

It is also important that at present, the United States is compelled to intensify on a long-term basis its military-political presence in Southeast Asia due to the risk of giving up its positions in that region to China. India also considers the region of Southeast Asia as one of the immediate spheres of its interests. Some Indian researchers are concerned about the penetration of the United States ‘under the guise of fighting terrorism’ even in Nepal and Sri Lanka being within the natural sphere of India’s own influence. And if in these regions Indian and American interests come into mutual contradiction, then India is unlikely to agree to assist in advancing US interests in Central Asia. Taking into account that Indian side offers its assistance in lobbying Central Asian interests in Southeast Asia, it has an additional incentive to firmly establish itself in that region at the junction of the Indian and Pacific Oceans and to minimize US influence here. In addition, the establishment of close contacts between India and the states of Southeast Asia can be viewed as its trump card in relations with Central Asia based on religious factor, since a number of countries in Southeast Asia claim leadership in the Muslim world in opposition to the countries of the Middle East, which Pakistan is traditionally focused on.

On the whole, it appears that possible penetration of the United States into Central Asia mediated by India will take into consideration and meet the interests of Central Asian states to a much greater degree in comparison with direct penetration of the United States. India is proud of its foreign policy that is not dependent on anyone, and even for the sake of productive relations with the United States it will not give up its image of politically independent state. Therefore, the US intention to use India as an assistant in promoting American interests in Central Asia does not mean that India will wish to play the role of such an assistant. As a result, all this in turn determines general (baring all described particular cases) not very obvious anxiety of India about the US influence in the Central Asian region.

And attempts by the US to penetrate into Central Asia with the help of Pakistan will be too visible to the latter, and certainly will unambiguously evoke negative response. This only circumstance makes them unlikely; such a probability becomes even smaller if one considers that Pakistan is not coping with the ‘task’ of the US regarding Afghanistan [see, for example, 9, p. 70+], or wants to carry it out in a way that benefits Pakistan itself. In this regard, one should note the position of Pakistan which has been formed quite long ago and even more shaped after the events of September 11, 2001. As many Pakistani authors point out, there is a serious danger that the full-fledged involvement of Pakistan into the US fight against terrorism will jeopardize its strategic goals in Central Asia, and that Pakistan will thus lose much of what it has achieved through joint initiatives with other regional powers. Moreover, Pakistani researchers are increasingly noting that the United States has made serious efforts to use Turkey and India to divert the Central Asian republics from Islamic fundamentalism spread by the so-called Iran-Pakistan axis; Pakistan, therefore, accuses the US not only of playing Indian-Pakistani contradictions, but also of trying to split Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO) in its goals and weaken Pakistan’s positions in Central Asia.

In other words, although theoretically there indeed exists probability of South Asia playing a role of vehicle of US interests in the Central Asian region, but it does not exceed the probability of the same role played by any other vehicle state(s), and is generally one of the minimal threats of such nature. Thus, the role of the US factor in relations between the countries of Central and South Asia is perceivable, but is in no way decisively significant.

A Factor of China. As yet in 2004 Indian expert P. Stobdan neutrally noted, “if India’s policy guidelines for relations with Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan have relevance for its Afghan policy, the guidelines for Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan should also include its China policy” [10, pp. 44-45]. After almost 15 years, Indian researcher M.S. Hussain explicitly pointed to the avoidance of usage of Central Asian region by two India’s arch rivals – Pakistan and China – in the list of key Indian interests [11, p. 118]. A. Bhattacharya also noted that “there is no real bonhomie between India and China, and there can never be, because according to Confucian thought, there cannot be two tigers residing on a single mountain”; on the contrary, India should strive turn to all possible advantages from China’s problems and weaknesses [12]. However, in general regarding the Indo-Chinese relations in Central Asia, it can be said that their existing political confrontation is combined here with a noticeable actual and potential partnership.
The first one is likely to escalate, since the Central Asian republics themselves almost openly talk about their intentions to use India as a counterbalance to China [see, e.g., 13, p. 102; 14]. In India it is believed that the growing influence of China in Central Asia worries the whole world and not just India, especially since China is trying to apply to the Central Asian republics the same strategy that it applied to Pakistan and Myanmar as India’s closest neighbours. And in general neutrally and in some ways even positively assessing the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the Indian side expresses concerns not only in relation to its own interests, but also to the interests of Central Asian republics. “The BRI promises the Central Asian region’s integration with a new and multifaceted transportation network, and, thus, connecting it to distant countries and markets. It is also viewed as changing Central Asia from a landlocked to a transit region and, thus, creating a new direction in its development”. However, this initiative “is not free from China’s geostrategic and political interests... China is flexing its economic muscles with an aim to... expand its political clout as well” [15, pp. 141, 144]. This, of course, cannot but alarm India (as cannot but gladden Pakistan which by many parameters is included by China into this initiative). Though, it is quite remarkable that the Indian side sees no interest in supporting the US campaign against the Belt and Road Initiative of China.

At the same time, India and China also have common political views upon many problems that in one way or another affect the Central Asian region, including Islamic radicalism, terrorism, drug trafficking, etc. And although the Indian-Chinese differences are well known within the frameworks of the SCO (so that in this organization India prefers to rely on Russia), but on the other hand, India and China are equally concerned about security issues associated with a certain degree of presence of NATO and other Western forces in Central Asia.

In any case, it should be emphasized that India considers the presence of Chinese factor in the Central Asian region mainly and sometimes exclusively from an economic point of view [see, for example, 7]. Indeed, China has in no way prevented expansion and deepening of political interaction of India with the states of this region, and only in economic aspect objectively tried to prevent Indian big business from penetration and consolidation here. However, in the geo-economic aspect, India can in one way or another interest China in cooperation in Central Asia, giving it in exchange areas of its own economic influence in other regions of the world. Moreover, work in this area has already begun. For example, in recent years, China, albeit too inactively, has been considering India’s proposal for cooperation in Chinese-owned Kazakhstan oil fields in exchange for similar cooperation in the Indian hydrocarbon fields in Sudan and Colombia.

Apparently, the Indo-Chinese geopolitical and geo-economic interaction in Central Asia will take place either in areas where same cooperation between them already exists in other regions of the world, or where Indian and Chinese interests do not overlap. For example, if it would be more profitable for China to offer low-level technologies to Central Asian states, then India will be able (and perhaps even forced) to share with them higher level technologies, which in any case will be beneficial for the Central Asian republics.

For Pakistan, the Chinese factor in Central Asia is clearly a positive thing, although it has long been overshadowed by Chinese accusations to Pakistan of spiritual nourishment, preparation and financing of activities of Muslim separatists in Eastern Turkestan [see, e.g., 9, p. 707]. What is more, it is China’s dissatisfaction with Pakistan’s pro-Islamic policy that gives Indian authors the opportunity to argue that India, the republics of Central Asia and China have the same views on many significant issues, in particular, economic development, the expansion of social and cultural rights, the threats posed by drugs and weapons trafficking, cross-border terrorism, religious extremism and ethno-religious separatism. However, it should be noted that Pakistani authors themselves are sceptical of India’s hopes of playing on the alleged Chinese-Pakistani contradictions, regarding these hopes as nothing more than “desired given off as valid” [see, for instance, 16]. Though, certainly, cooperation of Pakistan and China through the Central Asian region per se should not be viewed purely in a negative aspect.

A Factor of Russia. The role and place of Russia in the Central Asian region and the projection of this role upon cooperation of Central and South Asia has always been of great importance for both India and Pakistan, true, with their opposite attitude to this circumstance.

Despite occasional sporadic contradictions between India and Russia, these countries can without exaggeration be viewed as representatives of one side on the world arena and at any regional level that, in
principle, eliminates any need for any analysis of their interactional options. According to the former Prime Minister of India M. Singh, the Indo-Russian relations are an important factor in creating a safe and stable multipolar world [17, p. 2] with all the ensuing consequences.

Hence, it is not surprising that many Indian researchers positively perceive the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) in which, as they do not doubt, Russia plays a leading role (although Kazakhstani president is clearly acknowledged as its ideologist). Moreover, some representatives of India are quite easy about Russian-Chinese alliance in the Central Asian region as more efficient and generally successful alternative to the United States. “Leading powers such as the USA, the People’s Republic of China and the European Union established their presence in Eurasia, while the Russian Federation was keen to restore its influence in the region... In the second decade of the present century, Russia and China have firmly established their strategic partnership and are the leading actors on the Eurasian scene... Russian experts have put forward the idea of ‘Greater Eurasia’ [embodied in the EEU – Ye.R.], whereas China has put forward the idea of ‘Greater Eurasian Partnership’ [manifested in the New Silk Road concept – Ye.R.]. Incidentally, these projects were initiated after President Barack Obama announced the withdrawal of Western Coalition Forces by 2014. The long-drawn war on terror did not achieve much but left behind a resurgent insurgency. It was against this backdrop that President Vladimir Putin launched the EEU” [19, pp. 30-31].

Many researchers from the Indian side welcome and even consider to some extent necessary the Russian participation in the affairs of Central Asian republics and in the latter’s cooperation with the states of South Asia. Moreover, there are even opinions that despite all the declared multi-vector nature of the Central Asian states, they continue to go hand in hand with Russia in their foreign policy [see, for example, 18]. Some Indian authors at all consider Russia to be the natural ‘responsible power’ for events in the former Soviet Central Asia and a ‘comprehensive guarantor’ for the Central Asian region; in this regard, it is often proposed for India to interact with this region, in particular, in the field of security, only through interaction with Russia.

For Pakistan, according to statements by representatives of its ruling circles, at present Russia is a country with which its relations are realistic, businesslike, constructive, comfortable and correct, though not always sincerely warm. These official provisions, however, have virtually no effect on the position of Pakistan in Central Asia, not strengthening and not weakening it. However, Russia itself, while generally welcoming India’s potential and actual multilateral presence in the Central Asian region, tries to possibly distance Pakistan from participation in Central Asian affairs, at least in the political sphere, both by itself and as a conductor of interests of the West and China.

At that, according to the Indian side, Central Asia may acquire a special ambiguous value for India in the event of a sharp improvement in Russian-Pakistani relations. The trends towards such improvement are currently visible, although mainly in the economic sphere. Moreover, some representatives of India are of the opinion that “Russia presumably in deference to China or out to spite India for moving closer to the United States is forging a strategic partnership with Pakistan. However, it is a Russian strategic gamble and the longevity of this new-found Russian embrace of Pakistan is doubtful” [20].

Pakistani authors themselves, paying tribute to Russia for economic assistance through indirect implementation of projects within the China-Pakistan economic corridor, and like the Indians recognizing Russia’s leading role in ensuring full-scale security in the Central Asian region [see, e.g., 21, p. 4], yet objectively put China on the first place in the list of their own both political and economic partners, including these in Central Asia [see, for example, 22]. It is clear that all this is very comfortable for India from the point of view of its versatile alliance with Russia, including within the Central Asian space.

Concluding remarks. Thus, the role of external powers in interaction of states of Central and South Asia has certain but not decisive significance. It seems that in this regard, India will be most interested in that the Central Asian states as soon as possible acquire the status of real subjects rather than objects of regional and world politics in order they could likely to India defend their own interests in the face of world powers. In the interests of Pakistan, which failed to play either its historical-ethnic, Islamic or the ECO cards in relation to Central Asia, the main priority will be not so much to multiply but first of all, to preserve everything already acquired in this region. At the same time, both for India and Pakistan, neither the United States, nor the Russian Federation, nor even the People’s Republic of China are, at least politically, a serious hindrance or a tangible advantage in developing their own relations with the states of Central Asia – to a large extent because the latter have already entered the world arena as full-fledged
subjects of geopolitics and cannot be viewed in a serious ‘linkage’ to the interests of any world power. As N. Joshi and K. Kumari have reasonably noted in this connection, “at present, the interplay among the major powers has reached a levelling stage with their interests well balanced. While attempts by Russia and China to give a thrust to their regional initiatives are going on, the uncertainty in Afghanistan has kept the USA engaged. The success of these initiatives, however, depends on the response of the CARs and their willingness to cooperate” [19, p. 32].

In other words, the influence of the factor of powers upon the development of events in the Central Asian region and its relations with South Asia requires constant due attention, but simultaneous periodic variability, estimating inconsistency and in general insufficient elaboration, fixedness and meaningfulness of this factor proves the presence of theory of the ‘New Great Game’ in Central Asia but the absence of its actual practical manifestation. And this, in turn, is one of the positive moments in terms of external and internal security of Central Asian states.

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ОРТАЛЫҚ ПЕН ОПЦУСТИК АЗІЯ МЕМЛІКТЕРІНІҢ ЭРЕКЕТТЕСУІНДЕ АМЕРИКА, ҚЫТЫГА ЖОНЕ РЕСЄЙ ФАКОРЛАРЫ

Аннотация. Макала «ыртық кушиелік (астан державалардың)» факторын Орталық Азия республикаларының оңа өркеттесу шенберінде Опцустік Азия мемлекеттерінің мудделері түркісінде «Жылғы Улкен ойыны» деген шарпты тұрғыда ылыми ұйымдылықтын ышалай немесе жазылған қуәтеге асырылуы ретінде тапсырысты қарабастарды вілім мақсатын есеп тейін. Макалада көрініс тапқан құрғақ осы өзге сәлелері арқылы әкімшілік және құрылысқа ықылдық қызмет етуін қамтамасыз етеді. Құрылыстық, географиялық және және әлеқбай-экономикалық қоғамдар және қоғамдық, экономикалық, көздік және құрылыстық өндірістік қоғамда өндірістік, экономикалық және құрылыстық, экономикалық және құрылыстық, экономикалық қоғамдардың үшін өздерінің өзге өзге өзге өзге өзге. Орталық Азия мемлекеттерінің оңа өркеттесуіндегі Америка, Қытаялық және Ресєйдің өздерінің қоғамда бірінші оқиғалық жетілік оның мүмкіндігін неде көрсетеді.

Түйін сөздер: Орталық және Опцустік Азия, АКШ, Қытаялық Ресєй, Қытаялық, құрылыстық, интеграциялық бағытмәлар.

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АМЕРИКАНСКИЙ, КИТАЙСКИЙ И РОССИЙСКИЙ ФАКАТОРЫ ВО ВЗАИМОДЕЙСТВИИ СТРАН ЦЕНТРАЛЬНОЙ И ЮЖНОЙ АЗИИ

Аннотация. Статья ставит своей целью краткое аналитическое рассмотрение фактора «внешних держав» как истины или ложной реализации разделочного концепции «Новой большой игры» через призму интересов южноазиатских государств в рамках их взаимодействия с республиками Центральной Азии. Отраженное в статье исследование проведено на основе анализа появившихся в данной проблеме трудов и высказываний индийских и пакистанских исследователей и экспертов за последние четыре века. С учетом комплекса историко-географических и политико-экономических причин, основное внимание уделено роли и месту во взаимодействии Центральной и Южной Азии таких государств как Соединенные Штаты Америки, Китайская Народная Республика и Российская Федерация. Путем краткого анализа конкретных ситуаций и примеров показано, что применительно к каждой из указанных держав с представителем Индии и Пакистана имеется практически полный спектр положительных, нейтральных и отрицательных
теоретических выкладок и практического опыта, влияющих на оценку ими реальной значимости «внешнего фарфора» в отношениях их стран с центральноазиатскими республиками. В завершение делается вывод о том, что, несмотря на объективное наличие ряда признаков Большой игры в центральноазиатском регионе, этот феномен все же не получил здесь своей полной реализации в первую очередь в силу все более закрепляющегося фактического статуса государств Центральной Азии как скорее субъектов нежели объектов международных отношений.

Ключевые слова: Центральная и Южная Азия, США, Китай, Россия, «Новая большая игра», геополитика, безопасность, интеграционные инициативы.

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