

**Mukhit B. Assanbayev<sup>1</sup>, Reuel R. Hanks<sup>2</sup>**<sup>1</sup>Abai Kazakh National Pedagogical University, Almaty, Kazakhstan;<sup>2</sup>Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, Oklahoma, USA.E-mail: [mbasanbayev@gmail.com](mailto:mbasanbayev@gmail.com); [reuel.hanks@okstate.edu](mailto:reuel.hanks@okstate.edu)**KAZAKHSTAN’S RUSSIAN DIASPORA:  
BETWEEN MIGRATION AND SEARCH OF A NEW IDENTITY**

**Abstract.** The article proposes the Hirschman’s model of studying the changes in the Russian Diaspora’s perception of Kazakhstan as their new host-state. After the demise of the Soviet Union, their responses to decline of their political, social and cultural status varied from voicing discontent to exiting and loyalty throughout the non-Russian former Soviet republics, where they found themselves living in a new political reality. Not surprisingly their observable public sentiment went through a variety of negative expressions, such as confusion, desperation and even feelings of betrayal resulting from the need to learn new national languages and adapt to emerging nationalizing policies and practices of their new host-states. Many Russian people perceived the unexpected collapse of their common Soviet homeland as a personal drama, and some of these continue to identify more as countrymen of Russia rather than their homeland. This has become and will remain the main source of emigration aspirations among Russian Diasporas living in the former Soviet republics. The article draws upon the case of the Russian Diaspora living in Kazakhstan, where, even after three decades of national independence, many Russians still remain confused and too aloof to actively participate in the political and social life of the country.

**Key words:** Russian Diaspora, Kazakhstan, emigration, exit, voice, loyalty, host-state, identity, language policy.

**Introduction.** The collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at the end of 1991 created not just new boundaries between the 15 states that emerged from it, but it also birthed new economic, political, and ideological problems. The government of Kazakhstan, as had the governments of other newly independent post-Soviet states, not only faced the need to transform its economy, but it had to find a way to unite its diverse population under a single political and ideological identity.

The impact of this new problem became immediately apparent, as Kazakhstan and other post-Soviet republics experienced large-scale migration in response to the breakup of the USSR. This included not only extensive internal movement of ethnic Kazakhs toward better living conditions in its population centers, but also significant emigration of ethnic Russians to destinations beyond the country’s northern border within the newly emergent Russian Federation. This article intends to examine the search for a new identity among Russian Diaspora in Kazakhstan and determine why Russians have chosen in the post-Soviet era to stay in or leave Kazakhstan; specifically, this brief investigation will identify circumstances and other factors that affected past and current nation-building processes, as well as emigration dynamics within this population group.

**Methodology.** Albert Hirschman’s “Exit, Voice and Loyalty” theory that this study uses can be applicable to analyze the causes of Russian Diaspora’s emigration from Kazakhstan. I argue that of all the migration theories, the Hirschman’s model of the relationship between state and citizen appears to be the most appropriate for describing the factors that influence Russians’ emigration from Kazakhstan. It outlines exactly how their new reality drives them to choose to immigrate to Russia.

The Hirschman’s model provides an explanation for the conditions under which the categories of exit, voice and loyalty come into existence, conceptualizing “exit and voice as two contrasting, though not mutually exclusive” reactions by discontented customers of a firm or organization to a decrease in its quality of goods or services provided [1, p.15]. Drawing a parallel between discontented customers and potential emigrants from the theory’s perspective would mean that “exit” should be interpreted as

changing one's place of permanent residence, while "voice" should be interpreted as the option of articulating discontent. If we apply this "exit" and "voice" conceptualization to the relationship between Russians and the state (Kazakhstan), then the Russian diaspora exiting from Kazakhstan should be defined, in the words of Nigerian professor Eghosa Osaghae, as "disengagement or retreat from the state by disaffected segments of the citizenry" [2, p.47].

Hirschman's latest work, which he described as "an essay in persuasion on behalf of voice" [3, p.431], offers us a better understanding of why "voice" fails in the case of Russian Diaspora's migration, leaving "exit" as their main response to state policies in Kazakhstan. This was most clear in the case of replacement of ethnic Russians by ethnic Kazakhs in administrative positions and adoption of a new national language policy after Kazakhstan's independence in 1991.

Unlike in the German Democratic Republic in 1989, when "the escalating dynamic of out-migration led those who wanted to stay to take to the streets to demand change" (Brubaker 1990) [4, p.12-13], the large-scale emigration of Russians from Kazakhstan in 1994 could not similarly inspire the use of the "voice" option by those left behind. Hirschman's original model that "exit subverts voice" proved to be much more reliable than what he supposed in his latest work. A lack of loyalty towards the state, stimulated by political, economic and social instability, still dominates and motivates migration aspirations amongst Kazakhstan's Russian population. This case can be assessed only in terms of their loss of faith in the state. Meanwhile, the gradual and inevitable rise of Kazakh speaking population in the country reduces the very probability that the voice option among Russians will ever take place. It might be possible, but only with external support. What's more, Hirschman's perspective is useful in understanding the relationship between Russian Diaspora and Kazakhstan (as their host-state), it does provide a complete picture, although there are various contexts referring to broader non-migration issues, including identity, nation-building, and ideology, which will be described later in this paper.

**Why do most Russians want to leave Kazakhstan?** Consider the lives, realities, and sentiments of Kazakhstan's Russians today, in the wake of nearly three decades after national independence. How do they perceive their situation? What kind of feelings do they feel today? Are they feeling left behind or are they still searching for a new national identity?

The imperial nature of the deposed Soviet state left in all of its newly-independent republics (with the exception of the Russian Federation) a legacy of a vast array of philosophical controversies. Foremost among these was a long-established psychological assumption among Russians that their culture would have not only permanence in the farthest flung reaches of the former Soviet territory, but indeed superiority over cultures that originated there. Russian families in Kazakhstan, whose ancestors settled in Central Asia no more than a few generations ago under the rule of the last Romanov tsars or during the 70-year lifespan of the Soviet Union, had always identified themselves as "empire-builders." They were wholly unprepared for that identity to transform into today's post-Soviet "Russian diaspora," as they are officially portrayed, or just another "ethnic minority," a term only recently applied to Russians in the so-called "Near Abroad" [5, p.473-492].

Acceptance of the newly empowered Kazakh majority imposed upon ethnic Russian political power and authority a demand even more pronounced than simply sharing the cultural tableau of Kazakhstan; it invoked a complete reversal of their cultural dominance. Under the new political order, ethnic Kazakhs soon displaced Russians in key positions they held under Soviet rule, which challenged the social and political status that the one-time "empire-builders" enjoyed. Perceiving a zero sum situation, Russians viewed with distress their loss of power, which only contributed to negative sentiment in their community. Most were not ready to be consigned to the margins of power and authority, which led in part to large-scale migration back to their ancestral homeland.

The majority of Russian sentiment in Kazakhstan suggested that it wasn't easy for them to witness the emergence of a new Kazakh state; the crash of the USSR as a sovereign political power effectively meant the crash of the earlier messianic ambition of Moscow's great empire extending across Central Asia, and this undoubtedly undermined their collective psychological state. The new political reality was clearly at odds with the Russian image of how things should be. As such, those that were left behind in Kazakhstan publicly spoke of their considerable preoccupation with the need to adapt to a new political order.

Meanwhile, the concept of the Russian Federation serving as an "external homeland" became popular among many Russian Diasporas in all of the non-Russian post-Soviet states. This led to the emergence of

two competing identities among Russians living in post-Soviet space - an ethnic identity and a national identity. Among the Russian Diaspora in Kazakhstan, this competition continues today, and one of the main questions that observers of Russian diasporas seek to answer is which identity will eventually dominate. Of course, one can only speculate on the ultimate outcome of this competition as many Russians have not yet come to a final decision about whether they will return to Russia (repatriate), or continue to make their home in Kazakhstan (remain in their host-state).

**The dilemma of Russian Diaspora in Kazakhstan.** Should they stay or should they go - that's the dilemma of the Russian Diaspora in Kazakhstan. Before the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1989, approximately 6.2 million Russians resided in Kazakhstan, and they all faced the new reality of being demoted to the second largest ethnic group in the country. Kazakhs consisted of 40.1 percent of Kazakhstan's 16.5 million people, or 6.6 million people total, while Russians consisted of only 37.8 percent [6, p.247]. Alongside Russians in Kazakhstan were also those who were culturally Russified, but not of Russian ancestry. This varied group of nationalities who did not associate with the titular nationality of the host-country typically held strong ties to and affiliation with the Russian Federation. Pilkington and Flynn claim that at the end of the 1990s there were about 11 million people who could be classified as "culturally Russified non-ethnic Russian" residents of "Near Abroad" post-Soviet states [7, p.180-183]. However, despite the strong connection and affiliation with Moscow, these Russian-speaking people usually had little in common with ethnic Russian communities. Their differences ranged from the degree of integration they permitted themselves with their host-state to the economic prosperity of individual families. Crucially, they varied from each other particularly in political participation, social activities, and general expectations regarding perspectives about the future, including whether or not they intended to migrate [8, p.52-53]. The diversity of these groups, whether they migrated to Russia or remained as members of the Moscow-protected Russian Diaspora in the so-called "Near Abroad," presented a unique challenge to that country's authorities in figuring out how to integrate such a multi-faceted Russian-speaking population into a homogeneous, cohesive community.

Some Russians and culturally Russified populations of Kazakhstan had already made the decision to stay in the new republic, maintaining it as the place of their permanent residence and destiny. They adapted to new circumstances and adopted their new identity as citizens of their host-state. Others chose to migrate northward out of Kazakhstan to the newly created Russian Federation, thus returning to their ancestral pre-Soviet Russian identity, which of course differed substantially from their own personal former Soviet identity [9, p.29-31].

Those Russians that did return to Russia often perceived emigration as one of many adaptation strategies to unexpected political changes. The usual motivation for choosing this particular option was that it restored a perceived "historical norm;" migrants were repatriating themselves to "their" national state (i.e., the state whose name coincides with their ethnicity), rather than living in the past glory of the failed Russian Empire/Soviet Union. The concept of "repatriation," adapted from the decolonization experience of the developing world and other historic migrations, appeared to many who exercised it as a "politically correct" response. "Repatriation" is defined here as, first and foremost, the "return" of Russians to the territory of the Russian Federation, regardless of how long they'd lived outside Russia, and regardless of their employment and social status [10, p.42].

Taking into account the fact that quite a lot of Russians left the country for the past three decades after Kazakhstan's independence, one should ask a question: "Could Kazakhstan's national policies and practices have a negative effect on an ethnic Russian's decision to emigrate?" That's a tricky question.

Related academic literature analyzing the nature of those nation-building processes used by post-Soviet states tend to show a positive bias when qualitatively describing the lives of those who stay, whereas the statistical data on migration tend to show a more negative picture. What's known for certain is that steps taken to create a new republic in Kazakhstan have been more controversial than straightforward, and that the current debate over how to construct an indivisible nation is today just as complicated as it has ever been.

After carrying out extensive observations on the nationalist discourse of post-Soviet successor states in the period just after the breakup of the USSR, Brubaker categorized each of the newly independent countries as "nationalizing successor states" [11, p.166]. About Kazakhstan in particular, he noted this tendency in both the "distinction between the titular ethnic group and others," and "the claim to titular primacy." The resulting political hegemony exercised by the Kazakh majority as the titular ethnic group

resulted in the “nationalization of government and administrative personnel through recruitment and promotion practices” [12, p. 179]. In other words, Russians were replaced by Kazakhs in administrative positions shortly after independence, demonstrating a clear expression of their political dominance.

This dominance later extended into the private and state industrial sectors, when it was later observed that in Kazakhstan, “nationalization is evident in all key industries, major business and the labor market” [13, p.181].

The selection of Kazakhstan’s official language also proved to be an important early controversy. In order to promote the use of the Kazakh language, a new national language policy was formulated and implemented through a series of regulatory acts that some scholars labeled as “Kazakhization.” Despite this being the norm among the newly emerged post-Soviet states, the existence of the policy was officially denied. Nevertheless, academic observers frequently testified to its actual implementation. According to Karin and Chebotarev, this implementation appeared to take the form of harsh administrative measures actually aimed at forcing non-Kazakh speaking Russians to leave [14, p.22]. If this was the intent, though, such measures soon seemed futile. “Constructing a nation in a primordial sense in this multi-ethnic country (Kazakhstan) might well prove to be mission impossible” [15, p.265].

But to what extent is language a vehicle of identity? That’s difficult to answer for Kazakhstan because, within the country, ethnic identity is not perceived as being incompatible with a sense of national identity. It’s fair to say that this case is going to bring up issues, issues even ethnic Kazakhs will have to deal with.

Another common motivation behind a certain percentage of Russian Diaspora choosing to emigrate from Kazakhstan is about education-related problems. It is not a secret that quality education in Kazakhstan is becoming less accessible to an ordinary people. In this regard, the Hirschman model is again suitable for use, as it assumes that emigration aspirations often arise in families where quality-conscious parents display their disappointment with the quality of schools or education by changing their permanent place of residence instead of simply withdrawing their children from one school and sending them to another [16, p.16].

The issue of education in mother tongue is a very sensitive and emotional one. Many Russian families can’t even hypothetically imagine prospects for a loss of education in their mother tongue, meanwhile the ongoing debates about it in Kazakhstan had already motivated some people to migrate. Sebastien Peyrouse, a noted research professor who specializes in the geopolitics of Central Asia, summarized their feelings best. “The fear of an inability to offer younger generations a quality education in their mother tongue contributes to the push to emigrate. In addition, the majority of Russians cannot cope with the cultural and linguistic ‘nationalization’ of education and continue to regard the development of national languages with contempt. Many of them wish that Russian-speaking schools would operate according to the curriculum of Russia, rather than that of the state in which they live. They complain of the lack of textbooks coming from Russia, the willingness of the authorities to remove references to Russian culture from literature textbooks, and the negative vision of Russia developed in the new history books” [17, p.19].

Another interesting factor that often contributed to a family deciding to leave Kazakhstan and resettle in Russia was their response to external signals, particularly those broadcasted to the Central Asian country by Moscow-based media channels. These signals, speculating on the fate of Russians living in the countries of the so-called “Near Abroad,” became louder after the early 1990s. Particularly during Boris Yeltsin’s second term as the first President of the Russian Federation (1996-1999), it was normal to watch chat shows and news programs on Russian TV stations featuring footage of such populist Russian politicians as Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, Sergey Glazyev, Dmitry Rogozin, Konstantin Zatulin, Alexander Prokhanov and others. All of these personalities accused non-Russian post-Soviet leaders (even the relatively friendly Nursultan Nazarbayev, the first President of Kazakhstan), of violating human rights of Russians within their country.

Meanwhile, those Russians in Kazakhstan who chose to stay, rather than repatriate, often had to come to terms with and accept a peaceful transition from their Soviet-era empire-builder identity to that of an ethnic minority group. How families did this was often an ambiguous process, but for those who elected to integrate into the society of the host-state in which they resided at the end of the Soviet era, such coming to terms and accepting was inevitable.

Another interesting aspect of Russian emigration patterns involves the demographic distribution of the migrants: older, younger and middle-aged generations. In general, one can rely on the tendency that the older the individual, the less interested they would be in moving; this is true whether the move was within the nation's borders or to a whole other country. The ailments of old age tend to make people less mobile, or certainly less willing to be mobile.

After people settle into long-established lifestyles, they often will consider before moving the amount of prosperity they have at stake. Older generations are more likely to be retired, and thus, more concerned about their savings in their current host-state, and less driven by the potential to earn from new sources of income in a new country, where they can also face different obstacles to naturalization. It's easy to understand why emigration is not popular among this demographic.

In the case of Kazakhstan, the older generation of Russian Diaspora is no exception. They are the least likely to emigrate from Kazakhstan, regardless of income, education and employment status. They know well the many difficulties and obstacles they face in gaining employment and adapting to a new country. Therefore they usually reject repatriation to Russia or moving to anywhere elsewhere, for that matter. However, there is another reason that is less visible, but nevertheless subtly dominates this older demographic. It deals with the psychological issues connected to the fact that the representatives of the older generation have never been citizens of the newly independent Russian Federation. They used to belong to the former Soviet Union and they had affiliated their identity to being a citizen of the Soviet Union at best. It reminds the situation, when the older generation, in the words of Hirschman, "can remain loyal without being influential" [18, p.78].

Still, at the same time, older generations fully support repatriation of younger and middle-aged Russians to Russia. In the event that migration debates arise in the family, these younger members are traditionally urged on by the eldest family members.

Such individuals, of course, are not in the same category as those who consider themselves part of the Kazakhstan's Russian Diaspora. Nevertheless, in practical terms, there isn't much of a difference between the Russian who maintains his or her presence in the "Near Abroad" as part of the so-called diaspora, and someone who accepts the role of an ethnic minority in the society of that person's newly-adopted country. What differentiates the two is that the latter group of people, once dominant under the Soviet Union, has subordinated itself within the post-Soviet order. The process of subordination is hardly ever easy or simple. Indeed, having to constantly work through the problems of self-determination within the ever-changing reality of the developing Central Asian world means that Russians in Kazakhstan, as with anywhere else in the so-called "Near Abroad," will always remain at a crossroads. In the long run, some, but not all, will eventually remain lifelong citizens of their adopted country, saying "yes" to integration within their host-state. Others will eventually refuse to adapt, saying "no" to subordination to Kazakh society, thus provoking the younger generation to adopt pessimistic assumptions about their host-country and favor an eventual return to Russian society, which they will come to believe can only exist under the sovereignty of the Russian Federation. From that perspective, it is reasonable to consider that "a state's inability or unwillingness to supply public goods, including social justice and political liberty, is likely to decrease loyalty and thereby encourage exit" [19, p.47] of ethnic Russians from Kazakhstan. Loyalty, in the words of Hirschman, is key concept in the battle between exit and voice because it implies the possibility of disloyalty, that is, exit [20, p.82].

Anyway, Kazakhstan looks like one of the most favorable places for Russians to adopt as their home today. A 2015 pilot poll held in Kazakhstan in order to examine Russians aspirations revealed that 60 percent of all Russian respondents were not interested in emigration from Kazakhstan at any point in the future [21, p.102]. "The existing political system is allowing Russians to feel themselves relatively welcomed and comfortable in all spheres of a life," said Lobanov, a leader among the Russian Diaspora in Kazakhstan [22].

What can be said for certain from this latest poll, alongside the positive feedbacks and sentiments expressed by the leading representatives of the Russian Diaspora in Kazakhstan, is that a majority of Russians are adapting themselves quite readily to their new host-state environment.

Russia's demagogues who aggressively seek to restore nationalist or populist sentiments in their nation's contemporary political discourse, meanwhile, will find a ready audience among not only those Russians who return, but also those within the Diaspora. Their election campaigns invariably employ slogans that suggest Russia adopt the mantle of serving as the main protector and guarantor of rights of

Russians and Russian-speaking people in all of the post-Soviet republics. The past popularity of nationalist sentiment among Russian voters has led authorities in Moscow to adopt a new approach that has led to a whole new Russian compatriot policy. In the words of Barrington, Herron and Silver, the Kremlin “officially started to perceive itself to be the ‘external national homeland’ for all Russians outside the Russian Federation and claim a right and even a duty to monitor their treatment and status in other post-Soviet states” [23, p.293-295].

Over the decade that Vladimir Putin has ruled as President of Russia, this perception of an “external homeland” has transformed into a full-blown doctrine. Following up his nation’s declared annexation of Crimea, President Putin initiated on July 1, 2014, an intensified new wave of discussion and debate over the fate of Russian compatriots in non-Russian post-Soviet states by warning the world, “Russia will continue to defend the rights of Russian compatriots using the entire range of available means – from political and economic to operations under international humanitarian law and the right of self-defense” [24].

For better or worse, the Russian Federation today considers Russian Diasporas, Russian-speaking people, culturally Russified populations, or anyone else who feels sympathy for or has close cultural or political ties to Moscow, as significant factors in any strategic decision they adopt with respect to the post-Soviet “Near Abroad” republics, including Kazakhstan. It has taken two decades for Russian foreign policy to transform the concept of “external homeland” from a concept that appeared only in academic discourse (in particular, post-communist ethnic studies discussions conducted by such noted experts as Rogers Brubaker) to a subject of the most intense public discussion about Russian foreign policy.

**Analysis and Migration Statistics of Kazakhstan’s Russians.** Not surprisingly Kazakhstan’s policies and practices governing its continued development, including the establishment of those regulations that define the country’s language policy, only fueled Russian worries about their future prospects in the country during the first decade of Kazakhstan’s independence. Indeed, during the 1990s such policies served to strengthen anxiety among non-Kazakhs that national authorities would pursue nationalist policies and practices, at least at the local level.

Nevertheless, when analyzing the available statistical data from the early 1990s, it appears that emigration of Russian Diaspora from Kazakhstan was more likely to result from economic reasons rather than political. Although their migration out of Kazakhstan actually started during the administration of Mikhail Gorbachev in the late 1980s, it did not intensify immediately after the demise of the USSR at the end of 1991, when travel restrictions were effectively lifted for those who wanted to leave, but rather a bit later.

**The Early Post-Soviet Period (1992-1997).** According to statistical data, Russian emigration from Kazakhstan reached its peak in 1994 when some 283 000 people left the country. In other words, the evidence seems to show that outward migration of Russians didn’t coincide with their political opportunity to pick up and leave, but rather it corresponded instead with a period of difficult economic stagnation and crises that took place in Kazakhstan between 1992 and 1997, as it seen in figure 1.




Figure 1 – Russian emigration from Kazakhstan, in thousand. Source: The figure is developed by author’s calculation based on: Kulekeyev, Zh. [25, p.58]; Khustnitdinova, R. [26, p.23]; Smailov, A. [27, p.11]; Smailov, A. [28, p.12]

Meanwhile, starting in 1992, the year following independence, most leaders that headed post-Soviet republics literally worshipped liberal ideas and encouraged their adoption, if not by regulation, then by the collective consciousness of their societies. However, Kazakhstan was not so quick to follow this path. Under Kazakhstan's first president, Nursultan Nazarbayev, the creation of a market economy became the key pillar upon which the national administration would base its ambitions during the country's first years. The former leader often expressed his firm belief that the "invisible hand" of the free market would ultimately take control and put everything in its place, even within the state sector. His conviction inspired a lot of people to believe as he did and become confident that they would eventually live better, once Kazakhstan succeeded in creating its new market economy.

It was popular back then to believe in Adam Smith's theory, suggesting that "without the market economy we may fail," "only the free market economy is able to organize things properly," and so on. Nevertheless, the transition from a planned economy to one driven by the market itself was a painful process, one that was shared by nearly all post-Soviet states. These years, characterized by the implementation of "shock therapy," the sudden removal of socially protective price and currency controls that had existed in the socialist economy that operated under Soviet authorities, promised rapid and positive enrichment for anyone clever enough to find their niche in the open market, regardless of their ethnicity.

Kazakhstan sold off much of its state property during the years of rapid economic and social transformation that defined the period between 1992 and 1997. The Soviet-era social welfare system was phased out entirely, and new laws were implemented to eliminate state monopolies on ownership of land, significantly changing the socio-economic structure of the country's agricultural sector. Ambitious agricultural reforms led to the large-scale transfer of land into private hands, going well beyond simply re-introducing private ownership of land.

In the midst of these historical changes, ethnic identity ceased to be the main driving force for social interaction between and within different ethnic communities in Kazakhstan. On the contrary, changes left an ideological vacuum that was rapidly filled with a ubiquitous concern for one's own survival rather than the survival of a group based on ethnicity or social behavior. As a result, people began to idealize individualism. Some even believed that the tradition of the American dream - where social mobility was possible through hard work, ability, and achievement - was somehow being transplanted into the mindset of the citizens of Kazakhstan.

In short, the period between 1992 and 1997 represented a tectonic shift that led to a complete change in the migration dynamics for Russians and other ethnic minorities. Although economics drove large numbers of non-Kazakhs from the country, most of the residents of Kazakhstan favored retaining that country as their host-state. "We can talk about the migratory flow of Russians, but it's not a large-scale migration since many of them tend to return back to Kazakhstan. Those who left Kazakhstan now make up a small percentage. One thing, however, is clear. They keep returning home," said G. Belyakov, who took the reins of the Executive Committee of the Organization of Russians in Kazakhstan in 1997 [29].

Nevertheless, this is a time when the only constant factor is change. In Kazakhstan, change is forcing its citizens to question quite fundamental aspects of the life, including the search for both their origins and their ultimate destiny. With this in mind, it could be said that Russians tend to migrate from Kazakhstan in search of greener pastures.

**The Middle Post-Soviet Period (1997-2015).** Whereas increased Russian emigration from Kazakhstan in the years before 1997 could be shown to correspond fairly faithfully with the economic crises and political reforms that took place during those years, migration in the years that followed 1997 showed the opposite tendency. Kazakhstan enjoyed strong economic growth in the first decade of the new millennium as a result of large-scale exploitation of the country's huge oil reserves in the western part of the country. This prosperity continued through 2015 as a result of high oil prices, which allowed the country to gradually stabilize its national economy. The average citizen likewise enjoyed economic prosperity during these years, and this was reflected in Russian sentiments favoring staying rather than emigrating from Kazakhstan.

By 2003, conditions changed dramatically when Russian emigration from Kazakhstan started a lengthy period of steady decline. In 1994, the record high for emigration was set at 283 000. In 2003, this number was reduced seven-fold when the number of Russians leaving Kazakhstan dropped to 41 000 people. After 2003, emigration stayed relatively constant at a level between 20 000 and 40 000 people per year (figure 2).




Figure 2 –  
Stabilization of Russian emigration from Kazakhstan, in thousand.  
Source: The figure is developed by author's calculation based on Statistical data of the Committee on Statistics of the Ministry of National Economy of the Republic of Kazakhstan, from 2003 to 2015. Astana, 2016, published online January 2016 <<http://stat.gov.kz>> accessed October 11, 2017

This period of stabilization in emigration demonstrated that during periods of relative economic success, when the social welfare system provided improved support for its citizens, Kazakhstan became a host-state that generated much greater loyalty among its Russian compatriots. This apparent change in attitude among Russians in Kazakhstan shown in the statistical data is an indicator that most of them felt quite comfortable in the country's political environment. The stabilization of the rate of emigration demonstrated that Russians, once they found a suitable living strategy in their host-state, quite easily co-existed with Kazakhs within the post-Soviet political order, social environment, and economic marketplace of Kazakhstan.

The decrease in Russian emigration, however, also indicated that certain social factors that would have accentuated the significance of their ethnicity and created conditions of ethnic isolation (perhaps even driving ethnic separation) were absent in Kazakhstan. This was important as Russian Diaspora and other minority groups found themselves in the same position as that of the Kazakh majority during this important period in the transition of Kazakhstan from a planned to a market economy.

Meanwhile, as noted earlier, the years 2003 and 2004 provided the first truly significant change in the migration dynamics affecting Kazakhstan. This was when the number of Russian emigrants decreased from 41 000 to 39 000, marking the start of a steady decline in outward migration. At the same time, the number of Russians who arrived in Kazakhstan during its period of improved economic prosperity began to increase, peaking at 20 000 immigrants in 1999. In the four years that followed, through 2004, the number of new arrivals from the country's northern neighbor remained relatively stable, and then dropped to less than 10 000 in 2005. Ever after, the rate of Russian immigration gradually decreased, and short-term projections suggest that their numbers will drop even further (figure 3).




Figure 3 –  
Russians' immigration to Kazakhstan, in thousand  
(The figure is developed by author's calculation based on statistical data of the Committee on Statistics of the Ministry of National Economy of the Republic of Kazakhstan, from 1999 to 2015. Astana, 2016, published online January 2016, <<http://stat.gov.kz>> accessed January 3, 2018




**The Late Post-Soviet Period (2015 to Present).** There is every reason to believe that Kazakhstan has today become a relatively ideal place of multi-ethnic harmony and coexistence. Fears in the early 1990s that the process of re-defining interethnic relations in Kazakhstan would become aggressive appear to have been unfounded. The process can be characterized as having been more moderate than expected, if not entirely friendly and peaceful. In the words of local scholars, Kazakhstan, unlike in many parts of the former USSR, has actually pursued a policy that avoided ethnic strife, and fostered “zero ethnocentric” nationalist movements in its borders [30].

By pursuing an interethnic relations policy that respects tolerance as a national value, authorities have avoided negative events occurring during the transformation of interethnic relations in Kazakhstan. This was particularly apparent when a 2015 pilot poll was held in Kazakhstan in order to examine ethnic Russian aspirations. According to its results, 60 percent of the Russian respondents indicated that they were not interested in pursuing emigration from Kazakhstan at any point in the foreseeable future [31, p.102].

Nevertheless, over time, the post-Soviet migratory development among Kazakhstan’s Russian Diaspora did result in significant changes in the ethnic composition of its population. According to the most recent national census, held in 2009, Russian Diaspora now accounts for less than a quarter of the total population in Kazakhstan. In contrast, back in 1989 and 1993, Russian Diaspora comprised 37 and 36 percent of the total population of Kazakhstan, respectively. The period of greatest change, as noted earlier, took place in the 1990s, with the decline becoming more gradual from the year 1999, through 2005 and 2009, specifically amounting to 30, 26.7, and 23.7 percent of the total population, respectively. By 2016 Russian Diaspora constituted only 20.6 percent of the population of Kazakhstan (figure 4).

Figure 4 –  
Russian Diaspora in Kazakhstan (late 20th-beginning of the 21st century), (per cent of total population).  
Source: The figure is developed by author’s calculation based on statistical data of the Committee on Statistics of the Ministry of National Economy of the Republic of Kazakhstan, from 1993 to 2016, Astana, 2016, published online January 2016 <<http://stat.gov.kz>> accessed April 15, 2019



Despite the fact that past emigration of Russians have left a noticeable impact on the amount that remain today in Kazakhstan, they still reside in large numbers in the northern, central, and eastern parts of the country. Certainly, their numbers are not as dominant as before the ethnic and demographic changes that resulted from the large-scale emigration that took place in the 1990s. Nevertheless, we can infer from the statistical data that the geographic distribution of any future outward migration by Russians would likely remain unchanged, even if, as expected, the rate of net outward migration increases over the near future. However, very soon it might be reasonably argued that a Russian Diaspora might reduce in quantity further in any of these administrative districts.

**Conclusion.** In 1991, when Kazakhstan gained its independence, Russian Diaspora made up slightly less than 40 percent of total population of the country, while Kazakhs, the country’s titular ethnicity, had approached 50 percent or the threshold to majority, according to the 1999 census. The near parity that Russians enjoyed at that time did not prevent large-scale migration from Kazakhstan which started in earnest in 1992, the year after independence. The peak of Russian migration, however, took place in 1994, when some 284 000 people left the country. This dynamic remained high through 1997, which corresponded to the years of economic stagnation and crises in Kazakhstan.

With the emergence of a new political reality, the country’s Russian Diaspora experienced the painful process of transformation from the enviable status of being Soviet-era empire-builders to becoming either

an expatriated Diaspora, or just another minority group in a foreign land. Regardless of the eventual outcome of the demographic transformation that is still in progress, the migration process in which Russian Diaspora became a minority within the new host-state of Kazakhstan is almost complete. It is quite likely that in the not-too-distant future that the share of population held by Russian Diaspora will soon remain stable, year after year.

Although areas of professional interest and the resulting competition between the titular ethnic group in Kazakhstan, Kazakhs, and the second largest ethnic group, Russians, are quite different, Russians nevertheless keep feeling that they are mostly marginalized, while remaining unwilling to step ahead and learn the locally-spoken language of the country. This has always been the biggest obstacle to the advancement of Russian integration within the dominant Kazakh society. It is language that will likely be the disadvantage that will stimulate further massive departures of Russians from Kazakhstan. In the worst case, this problem can even foster the emergence of new challenges, such as agitation of separatist aspirations among Russians within those parts of Kazakhstan where they still dominate.

However, Kazakhstan's ethnic policy and its relations with Russia have been stable and productive for the last 28 years. This has allowed non-Kazakh minorities to feel themselves almost satisfied living in Kazakhstan. At the same time, the widely recognized status of Russian as one of the official languages strongly contributes to the stability of Kazakhstan, which differs considerably from some of the other post-Soviet states.

Nevertheless, many Russians remain unable to speak Kazakh. Therefore recognition of the official status of Russian as the "language of interethnic communication" in Kazakhstan will continue to serve as a successful example of creating a platform for mutual cooperation between the host-state and its Russian Diaspora. This is an excellent example of how an efficient policy in relation to languages can contribute to the attainment of national goals. This case, though, serves as a point of specific importance for Kazakhstan, since it is also the home of a number of other ethnic minorities for whom Russian must also serve as the primary language of inter-ethnic communication.

As Russian is still spoken widely by a significant part of the population, it's quite understandable why it remains also an integral part of public life. In this regard such language policy has become a clear message that Kazakhstan actually somehow cares about Russian Diaspora and entire Russian-speaking population. Nevertheless, Kazakhstan has to keep relying not only on effective domestic policies, but also on a supportive international political environment, which is crucial for the preservation of civil peace and inter-ethnic harmony in the country.

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### **ҚАЗАҚСТАННЫҢ ОРЫС ДИАСПОРАСЫ: ЭМИГРАЦИЯ ҒӘМ ЖАҢА БІРЕГЕЙЛІК ҮРДІСІ**

**Аннотация.** Мақалада Қазақстандағы орыс отандастарымыздың тұрып жатқан мемлекетінің (Қазақстанның) бейнесін ұғынудағы өзгерістер мен олардың елден қоныс аудару себептері миграция теориясындағы Альберт Хиршманның 1970 жылы шыққан «Шығыс, дауыс таныту және адалдық таныту: кәсіпорындағы, ұйымдағы және мемлекеттегі құлдырауға реакция» атты кітабында айқындалған моделін пайдалану арқылы қарастырылған. Модель шығыс (көшу), дауыс таныту (наразылық білдіру) және адалдық таныту (бейілділік) стратегияларының пайда болу шарттары туралы мәселені түсіндіреді. Аталмыш теория тұрғысынан алғанда, наразы клиенттер мен потенциалды эмигранттарды қатарластыру дегеніміз «шығысты» тұрғылықты мекенді ауыстырумен, ал «дауыс танытуды» наразылық танытумен және белсенді күреспен теңестіреді.

Орыс диаспорасының 1994 жылғы жаппай қоныс аудару мәселесі егжей-тегжейлі түсінуімізге Альберт Хиршманның 1980 жылы шыққан «Шығыс, дауыс таныту және адалдық: одан арғы ойлар және соңғы зерттеулерге шолу» атты кітабы қол ұшын бере алады. Бұл кітапта ол 1989 жылы ГДР-ден ФРГ-ге бағытталған немістердің эмиграциялық ұмтылыстары жайлы оқиғаны қарастырады. Сол жылдары ГДР-де қалғысы келген немістер бірігіп, шығыс неміс қоғамында жүйелі өзгерістерді қолға алуды талап етіп, билікке қарсы жаппай ереуілге шыққандығы көрсетілген.

Қазақстанның орыс диаспорасының 1994 жылғы қоныс аудару үрдісінің ГДР-дегі қоныс аудару үрдісінен айырмашылығы, Қазақстанда қалғысы келген орыстардың билік тарапына бағытталған талаптарының айқындалуына ешқандай септігін тигізбегендігінде болып отыр. Себебі оларда аталмыш жылдары тұрып жатқан мемлекетіне деген бейілділік болмады, ал сол жылдары Қазақстанда орын алған экономикалық және әлеуметтік тұрақсыздық орыс диаспорасындағы қоныс аударуға деген ұмтылыстарды ынталандырып отырды.

Осы орайда, авторлар үшін миграция теориялары арасында Альберт Хиршманның мемлекет пен азаматтар арасындағы қарым-қатынас моделі Қазақстандағы орыс отандастарымыздың тұрып жатқан мемлекетінің (Қазақстанның) бейнесін ұғынудағы өзгерістері мен олардың елден қоныс аудару себептерін түсіндіруде ең жарасымды екендігі аңғарылады.

Кеңес одағы ыдырағаннан кейін, пост-кеңестік республикалардағы орыс диаспоралары кенеттен өздерінің жаңа саяси, экономикалық және идеологиялық ақиқатында қалғанын түсінеді. Бұл орайда саяси, әлеуметтік және мәдени мәртебесінің азаюына байланысты олардың реакциясы өздері тұрып жатқан мемлекетке адалдық танытудан бастап, бұл жерден басқа мемлекетке қоныс аударуға дейін барды. Олардың әлеуметтік ортасында абыржу мен қажудан бастап елден біржолата көшіп кетуге дейінгі эмоциялар кеңінен орын алды, себебі бұл жағымсыз көңіл күйге түрткі болған нәрсе – олардың пост-кеңестік республикалардағы ұлттық тілдерді үйренуі және ұлттық саясат пен жергілікті тәжірибеге бейімделуі керек еді. Қазақстан тәуелсіз болғалы және саяси тұрақтылықты сақтап келгелі ширек ғасырдан астам уақыт өтсе де, Қазақстанда тұратын орыс халқы болашаққа негізінен сенімсіздікпен қарап, республиканың саяси-қоғамдық өміріне белсенді араласпай отырғандығын атап өтуімізге болады. Алайда, олардың ортасында елден қоныс аударуға деген талпыныс азайған. Аталмыш модельді пайдалану барысында қол жеткізілген нәтижелерді қазақстандық орыстардың эмиграциялық үрдістеріне және жалпыға ортақ кейінге қалдырылған миграциялық үрдістерге болжам жасау мақсатында қолдануға болады.

**Түйін сөздер:** орыс диаспорасы, Қазақстан, Ресей, миграция, Хиршман моделі, мекендеу мемлекеті, бірегейлік, ұлттық саясат, тіл саясаты.

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### **РУССКАЯ ДИАСПОРА КАЗАХСТАНА: МЕЖДУ ЭМИГРАЦИЕЙ И ПОИСКОМ НОВОЙ ИДЕНТИЧНОСТИ**

**Аннотация.** В статье рассматриваются изменения в восприятии русских Казахстана образа их страны проживания (Казахстан) и анализируются причины их эмиграции из страны путем использования в теории миграции модели Альберта Хиршмана, описанной в вышедшей в 1970 году его первой книге «Выход, голос и преданность: реакция на упадок фирм, организаций и государств». Модель дает объяснение условиям, при которых возникают стратегии выхода (исхода), голоса (протеста) и преданности (лояльности). Проведение параллели между недовольными клиентами и потенциальными эмигрантами с точки зрения теории означало бы, что «выход» следует интерпретировать как изменение места постоянного проживания, а «голос» следует интерпретировать как вариант выражения недовольства и активной борьбы.

Более детально объяснить ситуацию с массовой эмиграцией представителей русской диаспоры Казахстана в 1994 году поможет нам вышедшая в 1980 году работа Альберта Хиршмана «Выход, голос и преданность: дальнейшие размышления и обзор последних наблюдений». В ней он описывает аналогичное событие, которое наблюдалось в ГДР в 1989 году, когда наметился большой миграционный отток в сторону соседней ФРГ. Тогда немцы, пожелавшие остаться в восточной части, объединились и вышли с мощным протестом против властей ГДР с требованием немедленного проведения структурных перемен в обществе.

В отличие от восточных немцев, эмиграция представителей русской диаспоры Казахстана в 1994 году никак не могла воодушевить тех, кто решил остаться в Казахстане на вербализацию их требований в адрес властей страны, поскольку в их среде в те годы наблюдалось отсутствие лояльности к государству пребывания, а наблюдаемое в эти годы экономическая и социальная нестабильность в Казахстане мотивировало эмиграционные настроения среди русской диаспоры.

В этой связи, из всех теорий миграции описанная в теории Альберта Хиршмана модель взаимоотношений между государством и гражданами представляется авторам наиболее подходящей для описания факторов, влияющих на изменения в восприятии русских Казахстана образа их страны проживания (Казахстан) и на эмиграционные настроения в их среде.

После распада Советского Союза русские диаспоры постсоветских республик в одночасье оказались в новых для себя политических, экономических и идеологических условиях. В этих условиях реакция на

снижение их политического, социального и культурного статуса варьировалась от лояльности (верности) новому строю до эмиграции (выходу) из страны. Наблюдаемые в их среде общественные настроения прошли через множество негативных эмоций: от растерянности и отчаяния до желания эмигрировать, вызванных необходимостью изучения местных национальных языков и адаптации к возникающей национальной политике и практике в независимых постсоветских республиках. На примере проживающих в Казахстане русских можно сделать вывод, что даже после трех десятилетий национальной независимости и политической стабильности в республике многие из них по-прежнему живут с чувством неопределенного будущего и не случайно отказываются от активного участия в политической и общественной жизни страны. В то же время эмиграционные настроения в их среде пошли на спад. Результаты, полученные в ходе применения данной модели, могут быть использованы для прогнозирования эмиграционных настроений русских Казахстана и в целом для исследования феномена отложенной миграции.

**Ключевые слова:** русская диаспора Казахстана, Россия, миграция, модель Хиршмана, государство пребывания, идентичность, национальная политика, языковая политика.

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