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**IDEOLOGICAL BASES OF THE ISLAMIC GOVERNANCE IN IRAN:
TO THE HISTORY OF THE QUESTION**

Abstract. The issue of the concept of “Islamic republic” continues to be discussed in different countries by orientalist, philosophers, political scientists, lawyers, theologians. At the same time, many researchers pay special attention to the peculiarities of socio-political life, the nature of socio-economic transformations and other phenomena in the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) [1, p. 84]. In this, the authors believe that one can come to the right position with respect to the role of clergy in the Iranian revolution, recognizing both the peculiarities of the ideological foundations of Islam and revealing the clergy as a special group of people with their own specific ideals and organizational structure. It defines the content of the Islamic-republican form of government and offers its own vision of the theocratic regime in this country.

Key words: Islam, dynasty, Majlis, ulama, Shiites, monarchy, politics, ideology.

Introduction. As a rule, all interpretations of the “Islamic republic” in Iran are based on the book by Ayatollah Khomeini “Hokumat-e-jomhuri-eslami” (“The Board of the Islamic Republic”) and his famous speeches on building a fair state system, etc. As Said Amir Arjomand observes, “Khomeini's theory of 'wilayat-e fakih', created in 1971, is an important innovation in the history of Shiism, and it allowed turning the discussion of the rights of the regent into a theocratic political theory” [2, p. 153-154]. However, few mention Khomeini's predecessors, who first formulated the idea of creating an “Islamic republic.” According to N. Kuznetsova, one of the representatives of the Sufi movement in Shiism, Shams al-Oraf, wrote about the need to build a state in Iran on the basis of religious laws, back in the late 19th and early 20th centuries [3, p. 7]. One of the features of the views of Shams al-Oraf is the denial of the right of the Shiite clergy to lead the country.

Methods. In the analysis of materials and their scientific interpretation, we used the following research methods: analysis, synthesis, comparison, diachronic.

At one time, the Baha'is proposed their concept of creating a “world republic”. However, the Shiite clergy did not accept their idea, considering the Baha'is an accomplice of Zionism. One of the first to accuse the Baha'is of involvement in international Zionism, the leader of the Islamic organization “Tabligat e Eslami”, Sheikh Halabi [4, p. 158]. Also raised the question of creating a single Muslim state and Jamal ad-din Afghani. It should be noted about the influence on the Iranian clergy of Arab supporters of the creation of the “Islamic Republic”. This influence is most clearly seen in the works of Ali Shariati, who in the 1960s – 1970s. developed the concept of creating an ideal Muslim society following the example of the Muslim community of the time of the Prophet Muhammad and the early Caliphate. In this, he did not differ from other supporters of the return to the period of the “golden age” of Muslim statehood. And yet there is a significant difference between them.

Results. According to the ideas of A. Shariati, the basis of a fair Islamic government should be based on Imamite Shiism, i.e. the religion of “active protest”, and not inaction and the expectation of the arrival of the Mahdi. Supporters of “true” Mujahideen Islam must take authority, i.e. “Red Shiism” (Shiism of Alids), and not adherents of “black Shiism, i.e. Shiism of the Safavids [3, p. 8]. According to A. Shariati,

the head of an ideal state should be a true “follower of God”, ready to stand at the head of the revolutionary movement and improve the Shiite state on the principles of Islam. “Choosing the right position in relation to the role of the clergy in Iran,” says M. Fisher, “requires recognition of both the peculiarities of the interpretation or ideology of Islam and the recognition of clergy as a distinctive group of people with their ideals and organizational structure” [1, p. 84].

What is the peculiarity of the interpretation of Islam ideology by such prominent spiritual leaders as R. Khomeini, A. Banisadr and I. Yazdi, when they set forth the principles of the state system of the Islamic republic?

As you know, in Shiism (a branch of Islam that originated in the 12th century in the Arab Caliphate and advocated the rights of Ali ibn Abi Talib and his descendants from Fatima), spiritual leaders, adhering to the well-known concept of the imam, tried to stay away from secular authority. The prevailing doctrine (faith in a hidden imam) did not allow Shiism to form sufficiently strong state structures. Any earthly ruler, before the arrival of the Mahdi, can't be considered legal and true. Researcher of the theory of Islamic rule Khomeini Said Amir Arjomand once noted that “the most important feature that distinguishes Shiism from Sunni Islam is the separation of political and religious authorities and the transfer of autonomy from state to religious institutions” [2, p. 147].

R. Khomeini noted that during the “presence of a true imam or an imam appointed by him, he is the absolute ruler over the whole society and has all the advantages and conditions necessary for the leader of the nation” [5, p. 3]. According to the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, approved by referendum on December 2-3, 1979, the entire mechanism of power is under the full jurisdiction of a true imam, since he single-handedly sets laws, appoints executive and judicial bodies, manages the army and weapons, and puts the financial system in place. Apparently, the influence of the idea of Ibn ‘Arabi and the mall of Sadr about the spiritual development of the head of state and his attitude to the Muslim community affected here.

It should be noted, that the leading role of the clergy is one of the main features of the entire state mechanism of the Islamic republic. He controlled all the links of this mechanism and, all attempts to weaken this role were harshly suppressed by putting into action the most diverse levers of influence inherent in the very state structure of the Islamic republic.

The main center of state power in Iran was the “Velayat-i Fakih” Institute, the post of leader of the country, which was once held by Imam Khomeini. In the period of “absence” of a true imam, the Islamic state needs a special form of government, and the sacred texts contain a number of provisions that can serve as a key in approaching this problem. R. Khomeini identifies four such provisions. This provision is about fatwa, about advice, about mujtahid and about morality.

1. The provision of fatwa. It consists in the fact that the fatwas of those who meet the conditions for making the fatwa and are worthy of making decisions in accordance with the Sharia, i.e. to extract from existing documents and proclaim Islamic decrees must be carried out by those who do not have these achievements (ability to endure fatwas).

2. Regulations on the council. If any question is called into question, it is tabled for clarification of the truth.

3. The provision of Mujtahid (velayat-e fakih-e mujtahed). Whoever has the ability to interpret religious foundations and primary sources answers to the title of Mujtahid, Islam will bestow the right to guide over part of the property and citizens of society.

4. The provision of morality. Its content was not disclosed to R. Khomeini, however, he notes that its explanation is given in the fiqh book.

“The Imam is a symbol of society as an attribute of continuity,” A. Banisadr noted [6, p. 326]. The imam should not act as ruler. He is the embodiment of the Islamic order and a symbol of society. He seeks to ensure that Islamic principles are realized.

It should be noted that the ideas of Islamic rule, in which the Muslim clergy will be some kind of executive power, never prevailed in states where Shiism dominated. Islamic rule cannot mean a government, they say, since the basis of Shiism philosophy is the rejection of any form of government on the grounds that until the advent of the “hidden imam” any other government can only be usurper.

Mujtahids (Ijtihad practitioners) among Shiites (ash – shi‘a, adherents of Ali) are people who are in direct contact with the twelfth imam, due to their scholarship and high moral qualities. Mujtahids usually come from among the "Mawla" (Mullah), which constitute a special caste in the Shiite environment. Mujtahid is a mullah with a high level of religious knowledge. Thanks to this, as well as popular support, he is independent of state power. "Unlike the Sunni ulama," said Rodinson, "Shiite moles form an autonomous force whose wealth makes them independent of the state" [7, p. 19]. For him, the only legitimate authority is Imam Mahdi. Only with his return to society is order and lawfulness possible. Sometimes the Mujtahids have the honorary title of "Ayatollah" (God's sign), which serves as an honorary appeal.

If you look at Shiism historically, this branch of Islam arose as a religion of resistance of those regions and peoples who sought liberation from centralization under the auspices of the caliphate. From the point of view of Shiism, any secular authority that ignores the authority of the imam is outside the law. Legitimate power is the power of imams. For Shiites, Ali and the subsequent imams are depositories of hidden sacred meaning. Incidentally, the theme of the hidden message in some branches of Shiism (among the Druze and Ismailis) is so strong that any value of positive law based on the Qur'an is denied. As a result, Shiism has a complex religious hierarchy (mullah, hojjat al-islam, ayatollah). Among the members, a simple believer chooses his spiritual leader. One of the specific features of Shiism is that the Ayatollah, elected on the basis of universal consent, acts as the deputy of the still hidden imam. Another feature for Shiism is the cult of martyrs. For him, the evidence of martyrdom is of fundamental importance and directly related to the assassination of Ali in 661. On the whole, the specifics of the Shiite doctrine can be expressed in the following points: a Gnostic assessment of the hidden imam of the Qur'an; the expectation of the return of the messiah, which is associated with the revival and the Day of Judgment; devotion to the heirs of the Prophet; expanding the scope of the individual human mind's ability to interpret sacred texts; cult of martyrdom; the area of faith is governed by the direction of Allah; the economic system in an Islamic state should be based on morality.

Turning to the remarks of R. Khomeini, we will see that for him the best form of state structure during the period of "absence" of a true imam is a republic, whose authorities are based on sacred Islamic texts (the Qur'an, Sunnah) that contain the fundamental provisions of religion. Moreover, by the republic he meant a democratic system, at the head of which was not a monarch. Sovereignty is enjoyed by the whole nation, which expresses a common will to elect state bodies. In the Islamic Republic, these bodies should be combined into three groups: 1) a decision-making group (based on Sharia); 2) an advisory group; 3) the executive group. The decision-making group is the legislative branch. In the understanding of R. Khomeini, since the laws of the country should be Islamic laws, the decision-making group should extract them from the Qur'an and Sunnah and enforce it. The decision-making group is a kind of legislative power guided by religious regulations. The advisory group in the development and approval of various projects should be based on the decisions of the decision-making group. All decisions and fatwas are also an Islamic program of action for the entire Muslim society [5, p. 5]. If some fatwas can cause disagreement between members of the decision-making group, then the principle of advice applies. Fatwa is being discussed with the most respected theologians. If there is no consensus among them, then a vote shall be taken. In order to correctly solve the problem, technical specialists can be involved in the decision-making group and the advisory group. The Council of Specialists will help ensure that fatwa does not go beyond the Islamic canons, and at the same time it complies with modern realities.

Another body - the deliberative group - is in line with the modern parliament. Its deputies are elected by the people. This group discusses and considers various projects of state affairs, approves them in accordance with the interests of the country and passes them to the executive body. At least five deputies of this group must be *Mujahideen* and *Fakih*s, so that all laws are approved under their control and do not go beyond the scope of Islamic prescriptions. Their opinion in parliament is decisive. The third group (executive) is a collegium of ministers who are elected and appointed by parliament. Her responsibilities include the appointment of people to grassroots posts, the execution of state programs, the control of those responsible for a particular area of work, and the issuance of executive orders.

R. Khomeini believed that all employees, starting from the minister and ending with the rural judge, must be *Mujahideen* and *fakihs*. Appealing to the "great Islamic values", he declared that under the Islamic system everyone would be brothers and equals. Sincerity and brotherhood will prevail between people [5, p. eleven].

This situation in the construction of the state apparatus, despite the fact that it seems to be possible, in a fairly short time, to concentrate in the hands of a single leadership the solution of the issues of economic and social development of post-revolutionary Iran, which was in the interests of the people, narrowed down the range of opportunities for building prerequisites and further realization of the political role of the clergy, reducing the possible channels for achieving its goals and limiting its activities to the spiritual sphere. On the other hand, it contained the danger of the development of excessive centralization and centralized bureaucracy in the person of the clergy, which gained the opportunity for independent activity and the realization of their specific interests, which opened up scope for the "Islamization" of society.

R. Khomeini used his approach to the problem of land ownership primarily against the Shah's regime, its agrarian policy, which did not take into account that the land is "God's mercy and God's gift". Moreover, his reasoning is based on the following scheme: there is God who created the earth for the benefit of the people living on it. Based on the principle of God's ownership of the earth, all human activities on earth should be carried out within the framework prescribed by God, because after its creation God did not refuse it, so that anyone who wants to take it, and who does not want, abandon it. That is why, according to the logic of R. Khomeini and his followers, no one can be deprived of divine blessings, except in special cases when the use of these blessings harms other people and society. Thus, on the one hand, the earth and the whole world are in the absolute property of God, on the other hand, the earth and its fruits, in the broadest sense of the word, are at the disposal of individuals. God created and handed it to people. He allowed them to transform, acquire and turn land into property (under certain conditions and restrictions) so that they cultivated and transformed it for their own benefit, and this permission remains valid even during the absence of the twelfth imam, as in relation to the faithful and so "unfaithful."

The essence of such reasoning is to prove that a person has the right to use the land, as long as he masters it, i.e. processes and acquires the fruits of his labors; Does not impede its development by others who have legal rights to it; pays the tax established by the Islamic state. It logically follows from this that the acquired property is not the property of the state, but is in the personal property of a person. But R. Khomeini concludes: the land and the surrounding world are divided into state property, i.e. land and personal property not developed or acquired by anyone, i.e. developed and acquired lands owned by individuals, regardless of whether they are true or false. Based on these two types of property, a country's budget is created, consisting of two parts - state property, called the treasury of the imam, and national property, which is the treasury of Muslims [5, p. 14].

In turn, he divides state property into two types: property granted by God, and property in the form of *hums* (20 percent Muslim tax). The first type of state ownership includes unused lands, mountains, seas, rivers, property of former monarchs, lands and property conquered from infidels, etc. The second type of state property is formed by collecting hummus from war trophies, mining, found treasures, etc., from land transactions concluded by infidels with Muslims, from any income received. *Zakat* is a national property - a special type of tax, the collection of which is regulated by Islamic rules. The consumption of all these types of property is carried out by the Islamic government in order to cover the costs of maintaining the state apparatus and satisfy the needs of the population.

Unlike R. Khomeini, other theorists and ideologists of the Islamic Republic A. Banisadr and I. Yazdi sought to develop a model of Islamic society in which the main criteria would be social and economic justice, interpersonal and social harmony. A. Banisadr does not accept relations based on the principles of submission and domination, and introduces the concept of "positive and negative balance." By a "positive balance" he means a system of relations when a strong country, or a strong political system, or a strong person seeks to dominate others. In the conditions of a "negative balance" there are no relations of domination and submission. Since modern society is based on the principle of power, the "concentration of power" in the hands of individuals, groups or entire states gives them the opportunity to dominate others. The concentration of power leads to the concentration of wealth, and the concentration of wealth

enhances the concentration of power. He noted: “Those who do not have wealth do not have access to power” [8, p. 4].

The principle of “concentration of power” is, from the point of view of A. Banisadr, the universal law of the development of society. Based on this principle, a division of society into states took place; political, economic, social, ideological, cultural and religious systems arose. “Concentration of power” led to the emergence of “political power”, by which he meant a secular state, which in essence is anti-people. “This state,” A. Banisadr wrote, “does not recognize the right of the people to determine their fate. It brings racial, national and religious disunity, manipulates politics in its own interests, uses national wealth to concentrate and develop its power” [8, p. 42]. The system of “concentration of power” can be destroyed only with the elimination of factors that create the possibility of the formation of centers of power. A. Banisadr proposes to oppose “political power” to a “monotheistic (tauheid) society” based on three fundamental principles: recognition of monotheism, the right to free labor and appropriate remuneration, and refusal to use force in any form. He believed that a society based on these principles would not create the conditions for concentration of power.

One of the most important points of a «monotheistic society», from the point of view of A. Banisadr, is the question of property. Based on the canons of Islam, A. Banisadr indicates that the property belongs to God. However, he gives the following clarification: tools and objects of labor should be in common use and transmitted from generation to generation [8, p. 142]. Property is transferred by the Most High to the general disposal of all mankind. An encroachment on property is an encroachment on the Almighty. If we follow the logic of A. Banisadr, then a person is only the owner of his work. He cannot forcefully acquire other property or the results of another's labor. This excludes the accumulation of property, and, consequently, inequality between people. Only through labor does man become connected with God. The «tauheid» society outlaws any unearned income, since in this society the principle of a person's property only on his own labor dominates.

A. Banisadr considers the imamat to be the most correct form of government and organization of the economic activity of society, since it is free from vices of existing socio-economic systems. Under this form of government, people are not the absolute owners of the results of their labor. Therefore, a person cannot at his own discretion dispose of his work and the results of labor. «Since the nature and natural resources at God's disposal are limited and based on the fact that the goal of Islam is to free a person from unbelief and convert him to faith, a person's property in his work and the results of labor should be limited», A. Banisadr considered [8, c. 273]. In other words, a person in his activity should be guided not only by his personal interests, but also by the interests of society, of which he is a member and the interests of future generations. Therefore, in Islamic society, there must be an organic connection between people, society and God. “The connection of man with God is carried out through the connection of society with God” [8, p. 281]. A tauheid society should be free from class, national, and other differences, since Islamic ideology is based on tauheed: everyone before God is equal, perfect, and pious. A. Banisadr believed that no law can be adopted without taking this principle into account. The Islamic community should be led by an imam whose property cannot be absolute either. He has no authority to deprive anyone of the right to work and labor results. The Imam cannot be the absolute owner of the land as an object of labor; he cannot deprive anyone of working on the earth. All these and other restrictions are imposed on the imam for what A. Banisadr believed, so that he would not become a government.

The construction of a “tawheed” society should begin through the recognition of God and Islam as the only criteria governing human activity and social relations. For this, A. Banisadr noted, it is necessary to eliminate the shah's regime and establish a national order that will restore the country's independence, get rid of economic, political and cultural dependence on foreign states [9, p. 93]. In general, while sharing the basic ideas of A. Banisadr, I. Yazdi believed that the following features should be inherent in Islamic society. Firstly, this society should be independent in economic and political relations from external forces. Secondly, in this society there should be no “concentration of power” and violence. Thirdly, there should not be poverty in Islamic society [9, p. 2]. Fourthly, the principle of equality should prevail in Islamic society. Fifth, in this society wealth should belong to the whole nation.

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ИРАНДАҒЫ ИСЛАМДЫҚ БАСҚАРУДЫҢ ИДЕОЛОГИЯЛЫҚ НЕГІЗІ: ШЫҒУ ТАРИХЫ

Аннотация. Түрлі елдің шығыстанушы, философ, саясаттанушы, заңгер мен дінтанушылары «ислам республикасы» түсінігінің мағынасы туралы мәселені әлі де талқылауда. Зерттеушілердің көпшілігі Иран Ислам республикасының (ИИР) қоғамдық-саяси өмірінің, әлеуметтік-экономикалық өзгеруі және басқа да құбылыстар сипатының ерекшеліктеріне айрықша назар аударып отыр. Осы жерде авторлар исламның идеологиялық негіздерінің ерекшеліктерін мойындау және дінбасын – ерекше мұраттары мен ұйымдық құрылымы бар айрықша топ ретінде жайып көрсету арқылы, Иран революциясындағы діни тұлғалардың рөліне қатысты көзқарастың оңды болуы мүмкін деп есептейді. Оның ішінде ислам республикалық басқару түрінің маңызын анықтап, осы елдегі теократиялық режимге қатысты жеке пікірін білдіреді.

Иран Ислам республикасындағы «ислам республикасының» барлық түсіндірмесі Аятолла Хомейнидің «Хакумат-е-джомхури-эслами» («Ислам республикасын басқару») кітабына және оның әділ мемлекеттік жүйені құру туралы әйгілі баяндамаларына және т.б. негізделген.

Ирандағы мемлекеттік биліктің негізгі орталығы – бір кездері Имам Хомейни басқарған ел басшы лауазымындағы «веляят-и факих» институты. Нағыз имамның «болмауы» кезеңінде исламдық мемлекетке ерекше басқару формасы қажет, ал қасиетті мәтіндерде бұл мәселені шешудің кілті бола алатын бірқатар ережелер бар. Р. Хомейни осындай төрт ережені анықтайды. Бұл – пәтуа, кеңес, мужтахид және мораль туралы ереже.

Егер шиизмге тарихи тұрғыдан қарайтын болсақ, исламның бұл тармағы халифаттың қол астында орталықтандырудан босатылуға ұмтылған сол өңірлер мен халықтардың қарсыласу діни ретінде пайда болды. Шииттердің көзқарасы бойынша имамның беделін елемейтін кез-келген зайырлы билік заңнан тыс деп танылады. Заңды билік – имамдардың күші.

Жалпы, А.Банисадрдың негізгі идеяларын бөлісе отырып, И.Язди исламдық қоғамға келесі ерекшеліктер тән болуы керек деп санайды. Біріншіден, бұл қоғам экономикалық және саяси қатынастарда сыртқы күштерден тәуелсіз болуы қажет. Екіншіден, бұл қоғамда «күш шоғырлануы» және зорлық-зомбылық болмауы шарт. Үшіншіден, исламдық қоғамда кедейлік болмауы керек. Төртіншіден, ислам қоғамында теңдік қағидасы басым. Бесіншіден, бұл қоғамда байлық бүкіл халыққа тиесілі болуы керек.

Түйін сөздер: ислам, әулет, мәжіліс, ұламалар, шииттер, монархия, саясат, идеология.

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ИДЕОЛОГИЧЕСКИЕ ОСНОВЫ ИСЛАМСКОГО ПРАВЛЕНИЯ В ИРАНЕ: К ИСТОРИИ ВОПРОСА

Аннотация. Вопрос о содержании понятия «исламская республика» продолжает обсуждаться в разных странах востоковедами, философами, политологами, юристами, богословами. Многие исследователи особое внимание при этом обращают на особенности общественно-политической жизни, характер социально-экономических преобразований и другие явления в Исламской Республике Иран (ИРИ) [1, с. 84]. В данной статье авторы считают, что к правильной позиции по отношению к роли духовных лиц в иранской революции можно прийти, признавая как особенности идеологических основ ислама, так и раскрывая духовенство как особой группы людей, имеющих свои специфические идеалы и организационную структуру. В ней дается определение содержанию исламско-республиканской формы правления и предлагается свое видение теократического режима в этой стране.

Все трактовки «исламской республики» в ИРИ базируются на книге аятолла Р. Хомейни «Хокумат-е джомхури-йе эслами» («Правление исламской республики») и его известных выступлений о построении справедливого государственного устройства и т.д.

Главным центром государственной власти в Иране стал институт «веляят-и факих», пост руководителя страны, который в свое время занимал имам Хомейни. В период же «отсутствия» истинного имама исламскому государству необходима особая форма правления, причем в священных текстах содержится ряд

положений, которые могут служить ключом в подходе к данной проблеме. Р. Хомейни выделяет четыре таких положений. Это положение о фетве, о совете, о муджтахиде и о морали.

Если взглянуть на шиизм исторически, то эта ветвь ислама возникла как религия сопротивления тех регионов и народов, которые добивались освобождения от централизации под эгидой халифата. С точки зрения шиизма, любая светская власть, игнорирующая авторитет имама, находится вне закона. Легитимная власть – это власть имамов.

В целом, разделяя основные идеи А. Банисадра, И. Язди считал, что исламскому обществу должны быть присущи следующие черты. Во-первых, это общество должно быть независимым в экономическом и политическом отношениях от внешних сил. Во-вторых, в этом обществе не должно быть «концентрации власти» и насилия. В-третьих, в исламском обществе не должно быть бедности. В-четвертых, в исламском обществе должен господствовать принцип равенства. В-пятых, в этом обществе богатство должно принадлежать всему народу.

Ключевые слова: ислам, династия, меджлис, улемы, шииты, монархия, политика, идеология.

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